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CONTROVERSIAL”: FEDERAL RESEARCH OF
SOLAR GEOENGINEERING UNDER NEPA
Charles R. Corbett
ABSTRACT—Congress recently instructed the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to investigate stratospheric aerosols,
materials that could be injected in the atmosphere as a means of solar climate
intervention. This action has been widely interpreted as the first-ever federal
research project into solar geoengineering—proposals to slightly “dim the
sun” to limit the harms of climate change. This Essay argues that NOAA
should use its discretion to conduct a programmatic environmental
assessment under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) as an
initial step in governing this research program. Federal research into solar
geoengineering is an extraordinary and highly controversial policy. The
agency should carefully consider the environmental, social, and political
impacts that may come with this undertaking. Further, the public deserves
an opportunity to weigh in on the matter and to be apprised of its potential
benefits and risks. NEPA provides a rigorous framework for doing just that.
AUTHOR—Emmett Climate Engineering Fellow in Environmental Law and
Policy, Emmett Institute, UCLA School of Law 2019–2021. My thanks to
Holly Buck, Leilani Doktor, Sean Hecht, Ted Parson, Jesse Reynolds,
Shuchi Talati, and Daniele Visioni for their comments and assistance. This
Essay builds on an analysis published in a blog post on Legal Planet in
February 2020.
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INTRODUCTION
Solar geoengineering, first proposed nearly fifty years ago1 and
seriously investigated by a small scientific community since the mid-2000s,
has largely been sidelined from mainstream climate policy.2 The idea is
outlandish: Solar geoengineers would limit the ravages of global warming
by making the atmosphere more reflective, which would limit the amount of
solar energy that enters our planet’s climate system and thus cool the planet
off.3 Solar geoengineering could possibly be regional, with fleets of ships
seeding bright, shiny cloud cover over parts of the ocean, cooling the air and
waters below.4 Or it could be global, depositing reflective fine particles or
gases high in the upper atmosphere, which would cool the entire planet for a
time, much as some large volcanic eruptions have.5 Climate modeling has
shown that these ideas, as strange as they seem, could work. Planetary-scale
solar geoengineering would likely generate a rapid and substantial cooling
effect at modest direct costs.6
But solar geoengineering alone would be a clumsy and imperfect
response to climate change. It would not remove climate pollution from the

1

See D. N. Bernstein, J. D. Neelin, Q. B. Li & D. Chen, Could Aerosol Emissions Be Used for
Regional Heat Wave Mitigation?, 13 ATMOSPHERIC CHEMISTRY & PHYSICS 6373, 6373 (2013) (citing
MIKHAIL IVANOVICH BUDYKO, CLIMATE AND LIFE (1974)).
2
See Peter C. Frumhoff & Jennie C. Stephens, Towards Legitimacy of the Solar Geoengineering
Research Enterprise, 376 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A, Apr. 2, 2018, at 2–3.
3
See INT’L PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C 349–52 (2018) [hereinafter
IPCC]. Solar geoengineering also includes proposals to thin cirrus clouds to allow greater escape of
energy back into space, but reflectivity-enhancing interventions are better understood and more often
discussed by researchers. See id. at 348 tbl.4.7.
4
See id. (describing marine cloud brightening).
5
See id. (describing stratospheric aerosol injection).
6
See id. at 348–49.
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atmosphere, but merely mask its effects on temperature.7 Other climate
harms, like ocean acidification, would therefore remain the same or worsen
during deployment.8 It would also be temporary, lasting only a few years,
and so it would need to be reapplied regularly to maintain its cooling effect.9
Furthermore, it is unclear how global deployment would reverberate through
natural systems, or how regional interventions could disturb weather and
climate in other parts of the planet.10 This is why solar geoengineering could,
at best, only complement efforts to zero out greenhouse gas emissions
(“mitigation”). It can be no substitute.
There are also serious concerns over political control.11 Who will run
these research programs? Who will hold them accountable? Who will decide
what the climate will be? And how will these decisions interact with other
parts of climate policy? Some observers have concluded that it would be
impossible to resolve these questions fairly, or that the uncertainties inherent
in solar geoengineering are too great to allow research to go forward.12 Even
research advocates largely agree that deploying these technologies would be
far from ideal; it would be better to avoid research altogether and pursue
mitigation and adaptation alone.13
Or, perhaps, it would have been better: despite decades of warnings,
mainstream climate policy has largely failed to “bend the curve” on global
greenhouse gas emissions.14 It increasingly looks as though mitigation and
adaptation efforts alone will be insufficient to avert severe and irreversible
harm to the planet.15 Meanwhile, the effects of climate change have already
begun to appear, and they are expected to worsen at an accelerating pace.16

7

See JESSE L. REYNOLDS, THE GOVERNANCE OF SOLAR GEOENGINEERING: MANAGING CLIMATE
CHANGE IN THE ANTHROPOCENE 24–27 (2019).
8
Id.
9
ROYAL SOC’Y, GEOENGINEERING THE CLIMATE: SCIENCE, GOVERNANCE AND UNCERTAINTY 29
(2009).
10
REYNOLDS, supra note 7, at 24–27.
11
Id. at 28–30.
12
See, e.g., NAOMI KLEIN, THIS CHANGES EVERYTHING: CAPITALISM VS. THE CLIMATE 266–67,
277–78 (2014).
13
See, e.g., A. Atiq Rahman, Paulo Artaxo, Asfawossen Asrat & Andy Parker, Developing Countries
Must Lead on Solar Geoengineering Research, 556 NATURE 22, 23–24 (2018).
14
See William J. Ripple, Christopher Wolf, Thomas M. Newsome, Phoebe Barnard & William R.
Moomaw, World Scientists’ Warning of a Climate Emergency, 70 BIOSCIENCE 8, 8 (2020) (open letter
with more than 11,000 scientist signatories).
15
See Fred Pearce, Geoengineer the Planet? More Scientists Now Say It Must Be an Option, YALE
ENV’T 360 (May 29, 2019), https://e360.yale.edu/features/geoengineer-the-planet-more-scientists-nowsay-it-must-be-an-option [https://perma.cc/9SNJ-V8YN].
16
See IPCC, supra note 3, at 4–5.
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Amid failure and a looming sense of emergency, national governments
are quietly beginning to launch research programs on solar geoengineering.17
In December 2019, Congress appropriated $4 million to the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to research the impacts
of stratospheric aerosols on climate.18 Congress instructed NOAA that the
appropriation was for:
modeling, assessments, and, as possible, initial observations and monitoring of
stratospheric conditions and the Earth’s radiation budget, including the impact
of the introduction of material into the stratosphere from changes in natural
systems, increased air and space traffic, proposals to inject material to affect
climate, and the assessment of solar climate interventions. Within these funds,
the agreement further directs [NOAA’s Office of Oceanic and Atmospheric
Research (NOAA Research)] to improve the understanding of the impact of
atmospheric aerosols on radiative forcing, as well as on the formation of clouds,
precipitation, and extreme weather.19

17
See, e.g., Stuart McDill, ‘Cloud Brightening’ Experiment May Help Cool Great Barrier Reef,
REUTERS (Apr. 22, 2020, 3:08 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-earth-day-reef-cooling/cloudbrightening-experiment-may-help-cool-great-barrier-reef-idUSKCN2240ZC [https://perma.cc/T4W8AQXN] (describing Australian research on marine cloud brightening to slow coral bleaching on the Great
Barrier Reef); Graham Readfearn, Coalition Backs ‘Cloud-Brightening’ Trial on Great Barrier Reef to
Tackle Global Heating, GUARDIAN (July 14, 2020, 1:30 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2020/jul/15/coalition-backs-cloud-brightening-trial-on-great-barrier-reef-to-tackle-globalheating [https://perma.cc/A43F-6UAW]; James Temple, China Builds One of the World’s Largest
Geoengineering Research Programs, MIT TECH. REV. (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.technologyrev
iew.com/2017/08/02/4291/china-builds-one-of-the-worlds-largest-geoengineering-research-programs
[https://perma.cc/7EZ8-5GRQ] (describing China’s program as “one of the largest federally funded
geoengineering research programs in the world”).
18
See H. COMM. ON RULES, 116TH CONG., JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY MRS.
LOWEY, CHAIRWOMAN OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS REGARDING H.R. 1158:
CONSOLIDATED APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2020, DIVISION B – COMMERCE, JUSTICE, SCIENCE, AND
RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2020 17–18 (Dec. 17, 2019) [hereinafter JOINT
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT], https://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20191216/BILLS-116HR1158SAJES-DIVISION-B.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V52N-UX8Q]
(report
accompanying
congressional
appropriations for fiscal year 2020 containing the relevant appropriation instructions to NOAA Research);
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-93, 133 Stat. 2317, 2390–91 (2019) (containing
the total FY2020 appropriation to NOAA and instructing the agency to follow the specific program
designations within the Joint Explanatory Statement); see also CONG. RSCH. SERV., APPROPRIATIONS
BILLS: WHAT IS REPORT LANGUAGE? 1 (2010) (explaining the legal relationship between enacted
appropriations text and accompanying joint explanatory statements); Shuchi Talati, A Small Provision in
the FY20 Spending Package Deserves a Much Bigger Discussion, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Jan.
24, 2020, 2:36 PM), https://blog.ucsusa.org/shuchi-talati/provision-in-fy20-spending-package-deservesbigger-discussion [https://perma.cc/7JEU-8QZJ].
19
JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT, supra note 18, at 17–18 (emphasis added).
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The language is widely seen as the first federally funded and controlled
initiative to investigate solar geoengineering.20 These instructions could be
fulfilled—and likely will be—through modeling and passive observation of
the stratosphere to learn how it responds to aerosols introduced by natural
and anthropogenic sources.21 Scientists have long conducted research on
these topics,22 but Congress explicitly linked the project to “the assessment
of solar climate interventions” rather than conventional climate science.23
The questions explored go to the heart of solar geoengineering research
needs.24 Subsequent congressional reports on climate policy have also
highlighted the need for research into solar geoengineering techniques, and
subsequent appropriations will likely expand research funding for the
program.25 In short, this is a geoengineering research program.
These developments require concrete, practical thinking about
geoengineering research governance. If solar geoengineering could indeed
reduce some of the impacts of climate change, how should responsible
research proceed? What risks—environmental, social, political—are
involved in this research? How should those risks be managed? What tools
are available to meet those goals?
This Essay considers the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)—
a federal law requiring that federal agencies conduct an environmental
review of certain proposed actions—as a means of answering these

20
See James Temple, The US Government Has Approved Funds for Geoengineering Research, MIT
TECH. REV. (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/12/20/131449/the-us-government
-will-begin-to-fund-geoengineering-research [https://perma.cc/H5ST-K5KC].
21
See Emily Pontecorvo, The Climate Policy Milestone That Was Buried in the 2020 Budget, GRIST
(Jan. 8, 2020), https://grist.org/climate/the-climate-policy-milestone-that-was-buried-in-the-2020-budget
[https://perma.cc/AP32-PZTP] (quoting a NOAA official on how the funds likely will be used).
22
See IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 573–75 (2013) [hereinafter
IPCC, 2013] (summarizing the state of scientific knowledge on atmospheric aerosols and climate).
23
See JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT, supra note 18, at 18.
24
See Douglas G. MacMartin & Ben Kravitz, Mission-Driven Research for Stratospheric Aerosol
Geoengineering, 116 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 1089, 1092 (2019) (identifying solar geoengineering
research needs on “aerosol microphysics . . . , stratospheric mixing, stratospheric chemistry (principally
ozone), aerosol radiative heating and its effects on water vapor concentrations and on stratospheric
circulation, [and] the influence on cirrus”).
25
H. SELECT COMM. ON THE CLIMATE CRISIS, 116TH CONG., SOLVING THE CLIMATE CRISIS: THE
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION PLAN FOR A CLEAN ENERGY ECONOMY AND A HEALTHY, RESILIENT, AND JUST
AMERICA 526 (2020) (calling on Congress “to establish a research program” on solar geoengineering);
see also FY21 Budget Outlook: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, AM. INST. PHYSICS
(Oct. 15, 2020), https://www.aip.org/fyi/2020/fy21-budget-outlook-national-oceanic-and-atmosphericadministration [https://perma.cc/6A4J-2ZAW] (reporting that the U.S. House of Representatives enacted
language that would increase the program’s budget to $9 million for fiscal year 2021).
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questions.26 NEPA has substantial limitations for technological assessments,
especially concerning their future speculative impacts on society.27 But in the
right hands, NEPA can be a serviceable tool to consider the environmental
and social risks of this early solar geoengineering research program, seek
expert advice on governance, and engage and educate the public on
research.28
Specifically, NOAA should complete a programmatic environmental
assessment (PEA) under NEPA on its research program on climate
interventions.29 PEAs help agencies consider the potential aggregate
environmental impacts of a group of interrelated federal actions. They are
most useful in instances like this one, where the impact of any one proposed
action (i.e., research activity) would be too small to warrant environmental
review. NOAA’s PEA could consider the impact and significance of this
federal research program, its relationship to other research activities on
climate and solar geoengineering, and its potential impact on the physical
environment. It could then be incorporated into a NEPA analysis of
individual projects or experiments, all of which would otherwise evade
environmental assessment entirely due to their de minimis impacts.30 A PEA
would provide at least some acknowledgment, assessment, and ownership of
the risks at hand.

26
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4335 (2012). This Essay builds on an analysis published in a blog post on
Legal Planet in February 2020. Charles Corbett, Maxing Out NEPA: Environmental Review of Early
Solar Geoengineering Field Research, LEGAL PLANET (Feb. 25, 2020), https://legal-planet.org/
2020/02/25/maxing-out-nepa-environmental-review-of-early-solar-geoengineering-field-research
[https://perma.cc/64MT-4J52].
27
See Albert C. Lin, Technology Assessment 2.0: Revamping Our Approach to Emerging
Technologies, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1309, 1334–38 (2011); see also, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFF., GAO-10-903, CLIMATE CHANGE: A COORDINATED STRATEGY COULD FOCUS FEDERAL
GEOENGINEERING RESEARCH AND INFORM GOVERNANCE EFFORTS (2010) (high-level technological
assessment of carbon dioxide removal and solar geoengineering technologies).
28
This Essay does not consider deployment governance or governance of large-scale research with
significant environmental impacts because those questions are largely premature. Planned and foreseeable
research would have a vanishingly small impact on the physical environment. See MacMartin & Kravitz,
supra note 24, at 1089–90.
29
See Memorandum from Michael Boots, Council on Env’t Quality, to Heads of Fed. Dep’ts &
Agencies on Effective Use of Programmatic NEPA Revs. (Dec. 18, 2014),
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2016/05/f31/effective_use_of_programmatic_nepa_reviews_18
dec2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/PNG7-YKQR] (providing an overview of NEPA and discussing the
relationship between NEPA and PEAs).
30
See infra text accompanying notes 98–122. The proposed PEA is thus narrower, more focused on
near-term research, and more in line with NOAA’s current NEPA practices than other geoengineering
governance proposals that would make use of NEPA. Cf. Albert C. Lin, The Missing Pieces of
Geoengineering Research Governance, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2509, 2556–65 (2016) (discussing how
environmental impact statements under NEPA “often overlook indirect, cumulative, or programmatic
effects”).
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Admittedly, early-stage solar geoengineering research activities would
have little impact on the physical environment—far below what normally
triggers NEPA review.31 But the experiments would advance understanding
of technologies that could alter the planet’s natural systems in ways
unprecedented in terms of scale, impact, and intentionality. NEPA guidance
makes it clear that “extraordinary” or “highly controversial” government
actions call for a more searching review.32 This is the case here. Moreover,
the public should be allowed to weigh in on this development and receive
notice of the risks it entails.
Furthermore, besides a handful of exceptions, solar geoengineering
research has been limited to lab experiments and computer modeling by
private research teams.33 A national government launching its own climate
engineering “assessment” program raises the stakes. This seems especially
so given the national government in question is the United States, one of the
few countries that could plausibly spearhead global deployment of solar
geoengineering. At the same time, other research institutions, such as
Harvard University, are likely to go forward with their own field experiments
on the subject.34 Some of these experiments could require federal approval35
and investigate questions closely related to NOAA’s research objectives.36 A
PEA would allow the U.S. government to simultaneously, and
authoritatively, consider the impacts of all research activities potentially
occurring under its jurisdiction.
Ideally, Congress would lead public deliberation on solar
geoengineering research by holding hearings and debating legislation, rather
than leaving action to an administrative agency. Congress, however, as it so
often does on environmental issues, short-circuited its deliberative processes
and created this solar geoengineering research program through an obscure

31

See infra text accompanying notes 98–122.
See infra text accompanying notes 123–29.
33
See IPCC, supra note 3, at 351–52 (explaining that “global field experiments have not been
conducted and most of the knowledge about SRM is based on imperfect model simulations and some
natural analogues”).
34
See Framework, Deliverables, and Timeline, SCOPEX ADVISORY COMM., https://scopexac.
com/framework-deliverables-and-timeline/ [https://perma.cc/F4H5-88QQ].
35
See id.; see also John A. Dykema, David W. Keith, James G. Anderson & Debra Weisenstein,
Stratospheric Controlled Perturbation Experiment: A Small-Scale Experiment to Improve Understanding
of the Risks of Solar Geoengineering, 372 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A, Dec. 28, 2014, at 16
(describing coordination with the FAA in the context of risk mitigation).
36
See 33 U.S.C. § 893(a)–(b) (NOAA Research’s organic statute); see also About the Climate
Program Office, NOAA CLIMATE PROGRAM OFF., https://cpo.noaa.gov/Who-We-Are/About-CPO
[https://perma.cc/LF57-J4M3].
32
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appropriation.37 The duty to facilitate public engagement hence falls to the
agency tasked with carrying this research out. Legitimacy is one reason this
public engagement is worthwhile: thoughtful and open consideration of a
solar geoengineering research program, subject to judicial review, would
better cement the government’s claim of authority to start one.38 Doing so
would also satisfy NEPA’s core purpose, which is to spur ex ante
consideration of the environmental risks of major federal actions.39 Solar
geoengineering, if deployed, would have environmental impacts of a
magnitude that few other human endeavors have matched. Surely this merits
some environmental assessment at the outset.
Part I discusses the relationship between solar geoengineering research
and climate modeling. Part II then provides an overview of the NEPA
process and the opportunities it provides for governing federal
geoengineering research. Finally, Part III illustrates why an agency should
want to use its discretion here to engage in expansive NEPA review.
I.

EARLY FIELD RESEARCH INTO SOLAR GEOENGINEERING

Among solar geoengineering proposals, the best understood and most
discussed is stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI), as considered in the
appropriations language.40 A SAI program would introduce a thin “veil” of
aerosols into the stratosphere that, while suspended there, would reflect away
a small portion of incoming sunlight.41 Less solar energy would enter the
planet’s climate system, causing it to cool. Large-scale deployment of SAI
could deliver a substantial cooling effect, sustained for about a year or more

37
See JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT, supra note 18, at 17–18; see also Richard J. Lazarus,
Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative Democracy in Environmental Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619,
632–33 (2006).
38
See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 1511, 1528–33, 1547–50 (1992); Tina Nabatchi, Addressing the Citizenship and Democratic
Deficits: The Potential of Deliberative Democracy for Public Administration, 40 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN.
376, 376–77 (2010).
39
See Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109,
1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (“Perhaps the greatest importance of NEPA is to require the Atomic Energy
Commission and other agencies to consider environmental issues just as they consider other matters
within their mandates.”).
40
See JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT, supra note 18, at 17–18; see also IPCC, supra note 3, at
348 tbl.4.7 (providing an overview of solar geoengineering technologies, including stratospheric aerosol
injection (SAI)).
41
See, e.g., IPCC, supra note 3, at 349–52 cross-ch. box 10; Oliver Morton, Cutting Loose the
Climate Future from the Carbon Past, ANTHROPOCENE (July 2017), https://www.anthropocenemagazine.
org/geoengineering [https://perma.cc/6DAT-8JSP].
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after injection, at relatively low direct costs.42 Yet much scientific uncertainty
remains on the character, distribution, and controllability of SAI’s effects.43
As with other areas of climate science, modeling is central to improving
knowledge of SAI.44 Climate modeling is similar to weather forecasting but
is concerned with much larger scales of space and time.45 Climate models
use many lines of computer code to calculate past or future climate states
based on the inputs and assumptions fed into them. These models are then
used to study the climate system, the natural and human processes that
influence it, how it might behave within different greenhouse gas emissions
scenarios, and more. Current modeling shows that SAI is a technically
feasible climate cooling mechanism.46
Yet modeling has a few important limitations.47 First, models rely on
scientific equations to represent the natural processes that drive climate. A
climate model’s reliability will hence suffer where scientific understanding
is wrong or especially incomplete.48 Second, climate models run on limited
computing power. A computer can complete only so many calculations in a
second, meaning scientists must simplify the world depicted in their
models.49 Simplifications can help models incorporate parts of the climate
system that are too complex, too small, or too poorly understood to reliably
calculate. As said by one climate scientist: “Models are not right or wrong;
they’re always wrong. They’re always approximations. The question you
have to ask is whether a model tells you more information than you would
have had otherwise.”50
SAI modeling to date has used somewhat simple assumptions. For
example, researchers have simulated SAI deployment by reducing the solar

42
See Michael B. Gerrard, Introduction and Overview, in CLIMATE ENGINEERING AND THE LAW 1,
2–3 (Michael B. Gerrard & Tracy Hester eds., 2018).
43
See MacMartin & Kravitz, supra note 24, at 1090, 1091 fig.2.
44
See id. at 1091–92.
45
Q&A: How Do Climate Models Work?, CARBONBRIEF (Jan. 15, 2018, 8:30 AM), https://www.
carbonbrief.org/qa-how-do-climate-models-work [https://perma.cc/47JC-B8YP]. One way of defining
“climate,” after all, is average weather over a given period. REYNOLDS, supra note 7, at 8.
46
IPCC, supra note 3, at 348–49, 351–52.
47
See Q&A: How Do Climate Models Work?, supra note 45.
48
Cf. IPCC, 2013, supra note 22, at 743–45 (describing advances and limitations in climate
modeling).
49
This can be done through “coarser” spatial resolutions or through larger time jumps between
climate states. It is also done by using “parameterisations,” where a model uses fixed values to
approximate certain phenomena rather than calculating them out. Examples of phenomena parameterized
in models include scattering of sunlight by atmospheric aerosols, reflection and absorption of energy by
clouds, and surface reflectivity. See Q&A: How Do Climate Models Work?, supra note 45.
50
Gavin Schmidt, The Emergent Patterns of Climate Change, TED (Mar. 2014), https://www.ted.
com/talks/gavin_schmidt_the_emergent_patterns_of_climate_change [https://perma.cc/5Q23-4U6A].
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input—turning down the sun, essentially—and seeing what happens.51 These
findings should be treated as simple sketches of deployment, rather than
accurate predictions. But “simple” does not mean bad or worthless. Climate
models themselves began as somewhat limited analytical tools, gradually
adding more complex interactions as scientific understanding grew and
computing power improved.52 This progress has been essential to improving
knowledge of the climate system and the impact of greenhouse gas emissions
caused by humans.53 Furthermore, the projections of these climate models,
starting in the 1970s, have proven generally accurate when compared to
observational data collected later.54
FIGURE 1: THE WORLD IN GLOBAL CLIMATE MODELS

Fig. 1, showing the gradual evolution of climate models as they included
more aspects of the climate system, beginning with CO2, solar energy, and rain,
eventually adding land surfaces, ocean, sulfates, volcanic activity, clouds,
aerosols, biogenic processes, and more.55
51

See MacMartin & Kravitz, supra note 24, at 1091.
See IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 98 (2007) [hereinafter IPCC,
2007]; see also IPCC, 2013, supra note 22, at 743 (reporting continued improvements in climate
modeling).
53
See IPCC, 2007, supra note 52, at 98.
54
See Q&A: How Do Climate Models Work?, supra note 45.
55
IPCC, 2007, supra note 52, at 99 fig.1.2.
52
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Just as models improved climate depictions through “detailed
laboratory measurements, observational experiments and theoretical
analyses,” so too can they be improved for investigating SAI.56 Accordingly,
initial field research into solar geoengineering would seek to answer basic
questions of how the stratosphere behaves, how materials are distributed
through it, and how stratospheric changes influence the troposphere below—
the turbulent layer of the atmosphere where weather happens and where we
humans live.57 The data gathered would help improve models for depicting
future climate change and hypothetical climate interventions. However,
opposition to SAI and SAI-related research initiatives is not driven by harms
to the physical environment; it is driven by concern over the potential social,
political, and indirect consequences further down the road.
Considering a real-world example may help clarify why this is the case
and how this science works in practice. A team at Harvard University is
developing an SAI field experiment called the Stratospheric Controlled
Perturbation Experiment (SCoPEx).58 SCoPEx aims to improve the
understanding of SAI by studying how aerosols physically disperse when
released into the stratosphere and the composition of their subsequent
chemistry.59 To gather this data, SCoPEx will release a weather balloon into
the upper atmosphere carrying a small array of observation equipment.60
Upon reaching altitude, the balloon will spray a few kilograms of material—
water, calcium carbonate, and sulfates are candidates61—to observe their
56

Cf. id. at 98.
See MacMartin & Kravitz, supra note 24, at 1091–92.
58
See Keutsch Rsch. Grp., Stratospheric Controlled Perturbation Experiment (SCoPEx), HARV. U.,
https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/keutschgroup/scopex [https://perma.cc/UPT9-PN2Z].
59
See Dykema et al., supra note 35, at 5–6.
60
Keutsch Rsch. Grp., supra note 58.
61
Some readers may wonder why researchers are investigating sulfates as a potential chemical agent
for SAI; the Clean Air Act regulates sulfur dioxide as a criteria pollutant, and scientists have long
established the relationship between sulfur dioxide and acid rain, ozone layer depletion, and human
respiratory problems. See Renee Rico, The U.S. Allowance Trading System for Sulfur Dioxide: An Update
on Market Experience, 5 ENV’T & RES. ECON. 115, 116–17 (1995); Guy Brasseur & Claire Granier,
Mount Pinatubo Aerosols, Chlorofluorocarbons, and Ozone Depletion, 257 SCIENCE 1239, 1239 (1992);
see also Review of the Primary National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Sulfur Oxides, 84 Fed. Reg.
9866, 9874–75 (Mar. 18, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50). But scientists have also long studied
the cooling effect of atmospheric sulfates, such as the global cooling associated with large volcanic
eruptions and the regional cooling from industrial emissions. See, e.g., Brasseur & Granier, supra, at
1239; B. H. Samset, M. Sand, C. J. Smith, S. E. Bauer, P. M. Forster, J. S. Fuglestvedt, S. Osprey & C.F. Schleussner, Climate Impacts from a Removal of Anthropogenic Aerosol Emissions, 45 GEOPHYSICAL
RSCH. LETTERS 1020, 1020, 1026 (2018). Further, scientists have a good understanding of how sulfates
cycle through the atmosphere, soils, oceans, and ecosystems. See generally P. Brimblecombe, The Global
Sulfur Cycle, in 10 TREATISE ON GEOCHEMISTRY 559 (David M. Karl & William H. Schlesinger eds., 2d
ed. 2014) (summarizing the state of scientific knowledge on the sulfur cycle). Sulfur, fittingly, is the devil
57
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behavior, chemistry, and influence on the surrounding light and air.62 These
observations will help researchers improve modeling of ozone depletion,
aerosol longevity, and more, which in turn will help models render more
accurate depictions of SAI deployment.63
The opposition of some stakeholders to SCoPEx and similar field
experiments has little to do with their direct impacts on the physical
environment. If SCoPEx were to release sulfates, the amount of material
released would be very small, much less than what a commercial airplane
emits during “one minute of flight.”64 It would also be released at a very great
height, meaning the material would wash out over a far greater space and
become much more diluted by the time it reaches the surface as compared to
industrial sources.65 If SCoPEx were to use sulfates, it would have no lasting
or significant impact on the physical environment.
Similar to the controversy over early research into genetically modified
organisms, opponents’ concern is driven by potential consequences further
down the road.66 Critics warn of a slippery slope, where early research would
inexorably commit governments to bigger experiments, development of the
technology, and, ultimately, deployment.67 They argue solar geoengineering
could cause moral hazard, in that research would signal policymakers and
business leaders to take emissions cuts even less seriously than they already
do.68 Some consider it intrinsically wrong to tamper with nature this way, or
that SAI’s deployment would be inevitably unjust, given its global impacts
and centralized control.69
we know. See REYNOLDS, supra note 7, at 20. Some have proposed calcium carbonate as an alternative
chemical for SAI deployment given sulfates’ health and environmental impacts. See David W. Keith,
Debra K. Weisenstein, John A. Dykema & Frank N. Keutsch, Stratospheric Solar Geoengineering
Without Ozone Loss, 113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 14910, 14910 (2016).
62
Keutsch Rsch. Grp., supra note 58.
63
See Dykema et al., supra note 35, at 6.
64
Keutsch Rsch. Grp., supra note 58. A kilogram or so is several orders of magnitude smaller than
the emissions levels that harm human health and the environment. See EPA, INTEGRATED SCIENCE
ASSESSMENT FOR SULFUR OXIDES – HEALTH CRITERIA 2-3 fig.2-1, 2-4 fig.2-2 (2017) (reporting
hundreds of thousands of tons of sulfur dioxide emissions annually in the United States from fossil fuel
combustion, concentrated in the Midwest and Mid-Atlantic).
65
See Peter J. Irvine, Ben Kravitz, Mark G. Lawrence, Dieter Gerten, Cyril Caminade, Simon N.
Gosling, Erica J. Hendy, Belay T. Kassie, W. Daniel Kissling, Helene Muri, Andreas Oschlies & Steven
J. Smith, Towards a Comprehensive Climate Impacts Assessment of Solar Geoengineering, 5 EARTH’S
FUTURE 93, 97 (2017).
66
See Stefan Schäfer & Sean Low, The Discursive Politics of Expertise: What Matters for
Geoengineering Research and Governance?, in WORK IN PROGRESS: ECONOMY AND ENVIRONMENT IN
THE HANDS OF EXPERTS (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1–2) (Frank Trentmann, Anna Barbara Sum &
Manuel Rivera eds., 2018).
67
See id.; see also ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 9, at 39 (discussing risk of technology “lock-in”).
68
ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 9, at 37.
69
See id. at 45.
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Regardless of the specific activities NOAA Research plans to pursue,
Congress’s appropriation is intended, in part, for the “assessment of solar
climate interventions.”70 Research thus heads down this purportedly slippery,
morally hazardous, intrinsically wrong path. The next step, then, is to ask
what governance is appropriate in light of these serious concerns.
II. NEPA: PURPOSE, DESIGN, AND LIMITATIONS
The purpose of NEPA is to integrate environmental considerations into
federal agency decision-making and to assure the public that the agency has
considered those impacts.71 It does so by requiring federal agencies to
describe and analyze the environmental impacts of proposed government
actions.72 The bulk of impact analysis occurs through devising reasonable
alternatives to the proposed action and comparing the environmental impacts
between the different pathways. The agency must also describe the final
action and explain why it was chosen.
The Council of Environmental Quality’s (CEQ) implementing
regulations for NEPA—and their interpretation by federal courts—have
created an elaborate administrative scheme for NEPA’s implementation.73 A
few key terms are below:
• Environmental Assessment (EA): Environmental review document
prepared if the agency is unsure whether the proposal has significant

70

JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT, supra note 18, at 18.
Weinberger v. Cath. Action of Haw., 454 U.S. 139, 143 (1981).
72
Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ’s National Environmental Policy Act Regulations,
46 Fed. Reg. 18,026, 18,026–29 (Mar. 17, 1981) (describing requirements of the environmental review
process), rescinded in part by National Environmental Policy Act Regulations; Incomplete or Unavailable
Information, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,618, 15,619–21 (Apr. 25, 1986) (striking instructions regarding worst-case
scenario analysis).
73
CEQ promulgates regulations instructing federal agencies on how to complete environmental
review processes that comply with NEPA. It has recently finalized revisions to NEPA’s implementing
regulations. See Update to the Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National
Environmental Policy Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 43,304 (July 16, 2020). Among other changes, it controversially
limits which government actions trigger NEPA’s requirements, narrows the range of alternative actions
agencies must consider, and expands the role of nongovernment project proponents in developing
environmental analyses. See Rachael L. Lipinski, Jonathan D. Simon, Molly A. Lawrence & Joseph B.
Nelson, CEQ Issues Final Rule to Modernize NEPA Regulations, NAT’L L. REV. (July 20, 2020),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/ceq-issues-final-rule-to-modernize-nepa-regulations
[https://perma.cc/K63G-M5D3]. Environmental groups quickly filed suit challenging the new
implementing rules and seeking vacatur. See Nationwide Coalition Sues to Defend the People’s
Environmental Law, EARTHJUSTICE (July 29, 2020), https://earthjustice.org/news/press/2020/nationwide
-coalition-sues-to-defend-the-peoples-environmental-law
[https://perma.cc/SH47-NMQJ].
Given
litigation uncertainties and new priorities of the Biden administration, this Essay looks to both sets of
regulations. See Kelsey Brugger, Biden CEQ Pick Signals NEPA Changes, E&E NEWS: GREENWIRE
(Dec. 21, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1063721221 [https://perma.cc/R24K-7DPV].
71
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environmental impacts, or where a proposal without significant
impacts is unusual or extraordinary;74
• Environmental Impact Statement (EIS): In-depth environmental
review document prepared if the agency determines the proposed
action will have significant impacts;75
• Programmatic NEPA Review (PEA or PEIS): A broad, high-level
EA or EIS that examines the big picture environmental
consequences of a policy, often covering many interrelated federal
actions that may otherwise evade environmental review;76 and
• Categorical Exclusion (CX): Frequent or routine agency action
determined in advance to have no significant environmental impacts,
therefore presenting no need to prepare an EA or an EIS.77
Agencies retain discretion in how to structure their NEPA analyses’
scope, detail, and outcome, provided they take a “hard look” at the
environmental consequences of their proposals.78 For NEPA, a “hard look”
requires the agency to gather sufficient information about the proposal’s
likely environmental impacts, weigh the risks and benefits in good faith, and
explain the reasoning behind its final conclusion.79 Agencies also submit
their analyses to a public notice and comment process, allowing for
substantial input by interested members of the public.80 Courts will defer to
those determinations so long as they find them complete and reasonable.81 If
the court finds the analysis insufficient, though, it may remand the NEPA
process back to the agency to correct the deficiency.82 It may also enjoin the
proposed action in the meantime, depending on the circumstances of the
case.83
74
See James W. Spensley, National Environmental Policy Act, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
HANDBOOK 681, 695–96 (Thomas F. P. Sullivan ed., 24th ed. 2019).
75
See id. at 696–706.
76
See Memorandum from Michael Boots, supra note 29, at 6–7.
77
See Spensley, supra note 74, at 690–91.
78
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976) (quoting NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827,
838 (1972)). The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides the cause of action and standard of
review in NEPA cases. See Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 375 (1989); see also Citizens
to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415–17 (1971) (elaborating on the requirements of
arbitrary and capricious review under the APA).
79
Memorandum from Michael Boots, supra note 29, at 32; see also Forty Most Asked Questions
Concerning CEQ’s National Environmental Policy Act Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026, 18,032 (Mar.
17, 1981).
80
COUNCIL ON ENV’T QUALITY, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE NEPA:
HAVING YOUR VOICE HEARD 25 (2007).
81
Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 412.
82
See Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc., 401 U.S. at 420–21 (clarifying the requirements of
arbitrary and capricious review under the APA and providing a remedy).
83
See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 156–57 (2010).
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NEPA is said to be procedural rather than substantive.84 It requires
rigorous contemplation of environmental impacts but does not mandate an
environmentally friendly final decision by the agency.85 NEPA does not
require agencies to commit to mitigation plans to limit the environmental
impacts of the proposed action.86 Further, agencies need only consider the
reasonably foreseeable effects of their actions, not the related actions of
others outside their control.87 Also excluded are psychological harms the
proposal may cause, absent a direct connection to a significant physical
change in the environment.88 Similarly, policy objections to a proposal or a
proposal’s symbolic significance need not be analyzed.89
Despite these constraints, NEPA has been successful at compelling
agencies to produce thorough, thoughtful analyses of the environmental
consequences of major government proposals.90 It also provides a forum for
impacted communities to raise their concerns to the federal government with
the assurance they will be heard.91 NEPA has been justifiably criticized for
being overly burdensome at times, as in the context of analyses for some
proposals by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD),92 but on the whole, NEPA has been rightfully credited with
promoting a more cautious and conscientious attitude in government toward
the environment.93
III. IMPLEMENTING NEPA FOR SOLAR GEOENGINEERING RESEARCH
Basic scientific research is often a poor fit for NEPA review because of
its low physical impact on the environment, uncertain consequences, and
available CXs. NOAA, however, retains discretion to engage in a more
thorough environmental review in light of “extraordinary” or “highly

84

Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978).
Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227–28 (1980).
86
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 353 (1989).
87
Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 767 (2004).
88
Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 776–77 (1983).
89
See id. at 777 n.12.
90
See COUNCIL ON ENV’T QUALITY, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, LENGTH OF ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENTS (2013–2017) 1 (2019) [hereinafter CEQ] (reporting the average page length of
environmental impact statements across agencies to be 669 pages and the median to be 445 pages).
91
Spensley, supra note 74, at 702.
92
See CEQ, supra note 90, at 6 fig.3 (showing HUD environmental impact statements more than
double the page length of the average page length of statements across all agencies).
93
See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government’s
Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 905 (2002) (“NEPA is without question the most
widely emulated of the major U.S. environmental laws . . . inspir[ing] . . . numerous progeny around the
globe . . . .”).
85
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controversial” activities.94 A PEA would be appropriate in anticipation of
federal research on solar geoengineering given the profound risks and ethical
issues it raises.
A. Legal Bars to Compelling NEPA Review
Scientific research tends to be characterized under NEPA as an activity
that lacks environmental impacts. With NEPA, “Congress was talking about
the physical environment—the world around us, so to speak.”95 NEPA thus
requires a “reasonably close causal relationship between a change in the
physical environment and the effect at issue” to compel environmental
review.96 The results of scientific investigation are often uncertain, and even
more unknown are the ways in which government actors and private parties
might put that knowledge to use. As the National Science Foundation says
in its implementing regulations for NEPA, “the long term effect of the
accumulation of human knowledge is . . . basically speculative and
unknowable in advance.”97 Basic scientific research therefore rarely
produces the direct, physical environmental impacts typically analyzed
under NEPA.
The most pressing concerns regarding solar geoengineering research
also rarely present a clear basis for triggering NEPA’s requirements. Worries
about a “slippery slope,” for example, rely on a highly speculative causal
relationship between research and deployment. A few hypotheticals show
why: Imagine that an early, low-impact field experiment discovers that
atmospheric heating associated with aerosol dispersion is far greater and far
more uneven than once thought.98 Subsequent improved modeling based on
this data shows this heating would, in a global SAI deployment scenario,
likely cause long-term drought over major agricultural regions around the
world. Such a discovery could very well kill enthusiasm for solar
geoengineering leading to the idea’s abandonment and a lack of resulting
physical impact. Not doing research, conversely, could conceal this
drawback and needlessly preserve the threat of emergency SAI deployment.
Alternatively, solar geoengineering field research could uncover no
new drawbacks within climate modeling of deployment scenarios. Yet,
future decision-makers may still find the unknowns of SAI too daunting,
94

See infra text accompanying notes 121–135.
Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 772 (1983).
96
Id. at 774.
97
45 C.F.R. § 640.3(b) (2019); see also Albert C. Lin, U.S. Law, in CLIMATE ENGINEERING AND THE
LAW 154, 157–58 (Michael B. Gerrard & Tracy Hester eds., 2018).
98
See OLIVER MORTON, THE PLANET REMADE: HOW GEOENGINEERING COULD CHANGE THE
WORLD 111 (2015) (describing stratospheric heating).
95
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preferring the dangers and diffuse accountability of a greenhouse Earth to a
geoengineered one, again, producing no direct physical impact. Or more
optimistically, aggressive efforts on climate mitigation, adaptation, and
carbon removal could obviate the need to consider deploying SAI at all.
NEPA requires a “reasonably close causal relationship” between
proposed action and potential impact, akin to “proximate cause from tort
law.”99 The chain of causation within slippery slope arguments assumes too
much to meet that standard. It leaps from field research to modeling, to
subsequent experimentation, to technological development, and, finally, to
deployment, all against an assumed backdrop of worsening climate harms,
lackluster mitigation, and high risk tolerance by political decision-makers.
Any one of these assumptions may be plausible, but strung together, they
make a future scenario too flimsy to compel NEPA review.
Supposing for the sake of argument that the causal relationship is
proximate, NOAA Research would still have no authority to deploy SAI and
no power to stop others from doing so. Such third-party actions would be
beyond NOAA Research’s jurisdiction and therefore beyond the scope of
what the agency must consider in NEPA review.100 This is the same reason
why moral hazard concerns on their own would not trigger NEPA review of
solar geoengineering research. Moral hazard arguments warn that
governments will delay mitigation and climate adaptation efforts out of the
belief that solar geoengineering will sufficiently protect against climate
risk.101 NOAA Research, however, has no authority to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions or lead adaptation efforts. It cannot delay what it cannot
control, and it, therefore, need not analyze moral hazard risk.
Left then to trigger NEPA review are the direct physical impacts of
research. But the environmental impacts associated with current, planned,
and foreseeable solar geoengineering research are minimal: a computer
model running in a lab, a weather balloon released into the sky. The Supreme
Court’s 1983 decision in Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear
Energy102 is on point here. At issue was the nuclear power plant on Three
Mile Island, Pennsylvania, the very same plant where in 1979 a nuclear
reactor appeared on the brink of a catastrophic meltdown and sparked a
national panic.103 After the Three Mile Island incident, the Nuclear
99

Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 767 (2004) (citing Metro. Edison Co., 460 U.S. at

774).
100
101

See id.
See Albert C. Lin, Does Geoengineering Present a Moral Hazard?, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 673, 678

(2013).
102

460 U.S. 766 (1983).
See N.Y. Times, Three Mile Island Documentary: Nuclear Power’s Promise and Peril, YOUTUBE
(Apr. 29, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_0P9S4F4KpQ [https://perma.cc/48JA-9LPG].
103
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Regulatory Commission shut down all reactors at the plant and conducted a
safety review.104 The Commission determined that a nuclear reactor not
involved in the incident could resume operations; an EA accompanying the
decision concluded no EIS was required.105 Antinuclear group, People
Against Nuclear Energy (PANE), sued, arguing a supplemental EIS was
required to assess the mental anguish and anxiety in surrounding
communities over renewed fears of a nuclear meltdown.106
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, disagreed. The “risk of an
accident is not an effect on the physical environment. A risk is, by definition,
unrealized in the physical world.”107 The causal chain proposed by PANE—
resumption of plant operations, perception of risk, and experiencing
psychological harm—therefore exceeded “the reach of NEPA.”108 Justice
Rehnquist added:
[T]he question whether the gains from any technological advance are worth its
attendant risks may be an important public policy issue. Nonetheless, it is quite
different from the question whether the same gains are worth a given level of
alteration of our physical environment or depletion of our natural resources. The
latter question rather than the former is the central concern of NEPA.109

With this, Metropolitan Edison Co. pushes back against antinuclear activists’
use of NEPA litigation as a tactic to slow nuclear energy projects.110 It recalls
the Court’s decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., also written by Justice Rehnquist, rejecting
arguments for a more elaborate environmental review of a nuclear power
plant.111 The Court viewed these claims as brought out of steadfast opposition
to nuclear energy rather than genuine concern for environmental review:112
“Congress has made a choice to at least try nuclear energy . . . . The
fundamental policy questions appropriately resolved in Congress and in the
state legislatures are not subject to reexamination in the federal courts.”113
NEPA processes are thus no place to derail Congress’s major policy

104

Metro. Edison Co., 460 U.S. at 769–70.
Id. at 770 n.4.
106
See id. at 771.
107
Id. at 775.
108
Id.; see also id. at 779 (Brennan, J., concurring) (adding psychological harm associated with
“direct sensory impact of a change in the physical environment” would be “cognizable under NEPA”).
109
Id. at 776 (majority opinion).
110
See id. at 777 & n.12.
111
435 U.S. 519 (1978).
112
See id. at 553–54.
113
Id. at 557–58.
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decisions, whether that be the pursuit of nuclear energy or the research of
solar geoengineering.
There are also administrative hurdles to contend with. Through
guidance, NOAA has established CXs that could readily be applied to the
stratospheric research program mandated by Congress.114 Agencies develop
CXs for application to frequent agency actions that do not merit
environmental review because they have no or low impact on the physical
environment. Applying a CX obviates the need to do further NEPA analysis
in the form of an EA or EIS. A CX is available for NOAA computer
modeling, data analysis, and project development for research activities.115
Another CX would cover in-person or electronic remote observation of
natural phenomena, such as atmospheric data collection from weather
balloons.116 A third CX could be applied to “invasive [research] techniques,”
so long as they comply with federal environmental protection laws, occur on
a small scale, and have “no long-term adverse ecosystem impacts.”117 The
examples given for this third CX imply it is geared toward minimally
invasive research of living resources, like fish tagging and small-scale
sampling.118 Its language, however, would cover the negligible atmospheric
aerosol release of an experiment like SCoPEx, representing the outer bound
of the potential impact of near-term research.119
B. Opportunities for NEPA Review
The legal structure described above outlines the circumstances that
compel NEPA review and the minimum requirements of that analysis.
Federal agencies, however, may go beyond NEPA’s statutory minimum,
especially in light of extraordinary or highly controversial proposals. Solar
geoengineering research calls for just that.
The same NOAA guidance that establishes CXs under NEPA counsels
that more in-depth analysis may be warranted in “extraordinary
circumstances,” such as activities with “highly controversial environmental
effects.”120 CEQ implementing regulations for NEPA recognize a similar
exception: “An agency may . . . prepare environmental assessments” for
114

See NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. & U.S. DEP’T OF COM., POLICY AND PROCEDURES

FOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT AND RELATED AUTHORITIES app.

E at E-7–E-9, reference nos. E1, E3, E5 (2017) [hereinafter NOAA & U.S. DEP’T OF COM.].
115
See id. app. E at E-7–E-8, reference no. E1
116
See id. app. E at E-8–E-9, reference no. E3.
117
See id. app. E at E-9, reference no. E5.
118
See id. app. E at E-9–E-10, reference no. E5.
119
SCoPEx is used for analytic purposes. NOAA Research has announced no similar outdoor
experiments in connection to this program.
120
Id. at 4–5.
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some actions otherwise eligible for CXs in light of “extraordinary
circumstances.”121 The word may is permissive; the agency is under no
obligation to do an EA where a CX is sufficient.122 But agencies retain the
authority to conduct a more expansive environmental review where they
believe it prudent.123 Congress’s instruction to assess climate interventions is
certainly extraordinary: the program is unusual, contrary to prevailing
environmental norms, and essentially unprecedented among national
governments.124 Solar geoengineering research is also extremely
controversial, despite the minimal impacts that planned and foreseeable
research activities would have for the physical environment.125 It would
therefore be within NOAA’s discretion to launch a PEA on the first federal
research program into solar climate interventions.126
The PEA could consider the relationship between federally controlled
research, federally funded research, and purely private research subject to
federal permitting, such as SCoPEx and its peers. Specific research activities
covered could include modeling, atmospheric observations, and minimally
intrusive field experiments to collect data or aid in technology design. The

121
See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2010), rescinded and replaced by Update to the Regulations
Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 43,304
(July 16, 2020). CEQ’s recently finalized replacement regulations similarly allow agencies to conduct
EAs where a CX is available in light of extraordinary circumstances. See Update to the Regulations
Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act, 85 Fed. Reg. at
43,322–23 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4).
122
See id. at 43,322–23.
123
Courts tend to narrowly interpret NEPA’s “controversy” factor as requiring scientific uncertainty
or disagreement over a proposal’s physical impacts rather than political opposition or social unrest
regarding a proposal. See Emily M. Slaten, Note, “We Don’t Fish in Their Oil Wells, and They Shouldn’t
Drill in Our Rivers”: Considering Public Opposition Under NEPA and the Highly Controversial
Regulatory Factor, 43 IND. L. REV. 1319, 1328–29 (2010); see also William Murray Tabb, The Role of
Controversy in NEPA: Reconciling Public Veto with Public Participation in Environmental
Decisionmaking, 21 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 175, 188–90 (1997) (arguing courts are
inconsistent vis-à-vis “controversy” but tend to defer to agency determinations on that point).
124
See Extraordinary, 5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 614 (2d ed. 1989).
125
See Carola Braun, Christine Merk, Gert Pönitzsch, Katrin Rehdanz & Ulrich Schmidt, Public
Perception of Climate Engineering and Carbon Capture and Storage in Germany: Survey Evidence,
18 CLIMATE POL’Y 471, 473, 475 (2017); Malcolm J. Wright, Damon A. H. Teagle & Pamela M.
Feetham, A Quantitative Evaluation of the Public Response to Climate Engineering, 4 NATURE CLIMATE
CHANGE 106, 107 tbl.1, 109 fig.2 (2014).
126
See Update to the Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National
Environmental Policy Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 43,364 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4); NOAA & DEP’T
OF COM., supra note 114, at 8. Separate CEQ guidance advises programmatic review can take the form
of either an EA or EIS. See Memorandum from Michael Boots, supra note 29, at 12. The Boots memo
interprets the now-repealed NEPA implementing regulations, but CEQ finalized essentially the same
language in the corresponding section of the replacement rules. Compare 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (repealed
on September 13, 2020), with 85 Fed. Reg. 43,364 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4) (current
regulations).
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PEA, however, should exclude activities with a lasting, large, or widespread
effect on climate or otherwise resulting in significant physical impacts.127
Research with greater impacts would trigger a more intensive environmental
review, and they are well beyond the scope of likely near-term research
programs.128 Once complete, the PEA could then be incorporated by
reference when NOAA Research applies CXs to individual experiments and
research projects. Other research agencies or agencies involved in the
permitting of private solar geoengineering research, such as the FAA, could
also rely on the PEA when invoking their own CXs.
NOAA seems a good fit to lead this review—in consultation with the
FAA, EPA, and other agencies—given its duties to research earth systems,
protect marine environments, and manage living resources. Some lawmakers
agree on this point. A bill introduced in the U.S. House would expand
NOAA’s formal authority to receive reports and give recommendations on
solar geoengineering field research, though it would still lack permitting
authority over such activities.129 There would also be precedent within
NOAA for such a PEA. NOAA has completed PEAs for marine turtle
research and coastal hydrographic survey programs, though they lacked
significant direct impacts on the physical environment.130 What the agency
has done before, it can do again.
127

Cf. Michael Burger & Justin Gundlach, Research Governance, in CLIMATE ENGINEERING AND

THE LAW 269, 294 fig.6.1 (Michael B. Gerrard & Tracy Hester eds., 2018) (grouping solar geoengineering

research activities into phases based on scale and purpose).
128
See id.
129
See Atmospheric Climate Intervention Research Act, H.R. 5519, 116th Cong. § 3 (2019)
(proposing to amend NOAA Research’s organic statute, 33 U.S.C. § 893, to expressly cover solar
geoengineering research activities and to clarify the agency’s advisory role on private sector weather
modification activities under the Weather Modification Reporting Act of 1972). The Weather
Modification Reporting Act requires any private person to submit a report to the Secretary of Commerce
on “any weather modification activity,” see 15 U.S.C. § 330a, defined as “any activity performed with
the intention of producing artificial changes in the composition, behavior, or dynamics of the
atmosphere.” 15 U.S.C. § 330. The Secretary later delegated this responsibility to NOAA Research.
NOAA’s implementing regulations clarify that this reporting requirement applies to solar geoengineering
activities. See 15 C.F.R. § 908.3(a)(3) (“[W]eather modification activities . . . subject to reporting
[include] . . . “[m]odifying the solar radiation exchange of the earth or clouds, through the release of
gases, dusts, liquids, or aerosols into the atmosphere.”). NOAA may notify local authorities or issue
recommendations in response to such reporting, but “[n]otification or recommendation, or failure to notify
or recommend, shall not be construed as approval or disapproval of a proposed project.” 15 C.F.R.
§ 908.12(d) (emphasis added); see also id. (describing the agency’s order as “advisory”). H.R. 5519 thus
would formally recognize NOAA Research’s advisory role in private solar geoengineering research
proposals but would not give it authority to regulate by permit.
130
See NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV. & PAC. ISLANDS
FISHERIES SCI. CTR., PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT OF THE MARINE TURTLE
RESEARCH PROGRAM (MTRP) AT THE PACIFIC ISLAND FISHERIES SCIENCE CENTER (PIFSC), PROTECTED
SPECIES DIVISION (PSD) 2 (2011) [hereinafter NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.]; OFF. OF
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The PEA process could begin by publishing a request for public
comment for scoping the proposed research and the concerns that
environmental review should address.131 This would allow for experts and
the interested public to weigh in on the agency’s initial research plan. Once
scoping is complete, the agency could evaluate the risks associated with
different research plans and potential methods to limit those risks. To address
slippery slope concerns, for example, NOAA Research could articulate
limits to the research objectives and activities. The PEA could also give some
consideration to the more abstract risks associated with an early research
program, such as moral hazard. It may also consider the more abstract risks
of not doing research, namely, a warmer world facing mounting climate
harms but lacking experience with SAI research and governance.
The NEPA process would also be an opportunity to engage with the
public. It would provide for public comment and public hearings, with
remarks noted and responded to within the PEA.132 The NEPA process would
give NOAA Research a chance to contextualize the program, describe its
negligible physical impacts, and correct possible misconceptions about solar
geoengineering.133 Finally, NOAA Research could give assurances that
research will not slip into SAI technology development or deployment—
perhaps by making such promises in the Record of Decision produced at the
close of the NEPA process. Such commitments would be binding: courts can
enforce mitigation and control measures announced in the Records of
Decision.134 NEPA, of course, does not compel any mitigation or control
measures. The agency would decide how much responsibility to take on. But
the option is available to make binding commitments to the public if the
agency wishes to do so.
IV. WHY GOVERN?
This expansive approach to NEPA may strike some as counterintuitive.
NEPA can be a burdensome exercise in low-quality information
COAST SURVEY, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT FOR THE OFFICE OF COAST SURVEY HYDROGRAPHIC SURVEY PROJECTS 8–9 (2013).
131
Scoping is the process of identifying and defining issues requiring environmental analysis. See
40 C.F.R. § 1501.9 (effective Sept. 14, 2020).
132
See Weinberger v. Cath. Action of Haw., 454 U.S. 139, 143 (1981) (“Through the disclosure of
an EIS, the public is made aware that the agency has taken environmental considerations into account.”).
133
See Charles R. Corbett, Chemtrails and Solar Geoengineers: Governing Online Conspiracy
Theory Misinformation, 85 MO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 13) (on file with author)
(describing pervasive misinformation online about solar geoengineering); see also Dustin Tingley &
Gernot Wagner, Solar Geoengineering and the Chemtrails Conspiracy on Social Media, 3 PALGRAVE
COMMC’NS 1, 1–2 (2017).
134
See Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ’s National Environmental Policy Act
Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026, 18,037 (Mar. 23, 1981).
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production.135 Its laboriousness incentivizes agencies to minimize or
downplay environmental impacts to avoid triggering in-depth environmental
assessments.136 Judicial review can also greatly add to the agency’s
administrative burden; NEPA processes frequently give rise to
environmental litigation against agency decision-making.137 Given these
considerations, agency officials may wonder why an agency would ever
volunteer for a more comprehensive NEPA review.
There are three reasons why. First, NEPA’s public participation
components and procedural rigor would bolster the project’s legitimacy.
Second, it may improve the research agenda and governance, while also
giving complimentary climate policy processes time to come to fruition.
Third, it would serve as a valuable opportunity for the agency to provide
global leadership on solar geoengineering governance at a relatively low
administrative cost.
A. Legitimacy
Legitimacy describes a valid or rightful use of power by a governing
authority.138 Roughly speaking, a government action can be found legitimate
where it is lawful, justified, and socially accepted.139 Within liberal
democracies, legitimacy often “invokes . . . values including responsiveness,
transparency, participation, deliberation[,] and [public] engagement.”140
Such societies often enact those democratic values by incorporating robust
public participation mechanisms in government decision-making.141 It
follows that robust public participation mechanisms can also bolster the
legitimacy of federal solar geoengineering research.142 Of course, there are
other sources of legitimacy—the administrative state, in particular, can claim
135

See Karkkainen, supra note 93, at 917.
See id. at 936; COUNCIL ON ENV’T QUALITY, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, FACT SHEET: CEQ’S
PROPOSAL TO MODERNIZE ITS NEPA IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS 1 (2020).
137
See, e.g., AUDREY BIXLER, R. PATRICK BIXLER, AUTUMN ELLISON & CASSANDRA MOSELEY,
ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF NEPA DECISIONS: RISK FACTORS AND RISK MINIMIZING
STRATEGIES FOR THE FOREST SERVICE 16–19 (2016) (reviewing literature describing NEPA cases
brought against the U.S. Forest Service).
138
See Arthur Isak Applbaum, Legitimacy Without the Duty to Obey, 38 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 215,
216–17 (2010) (arguing legitimacy at minimum encompasses “the right to rule”).
139
See Steven Bernstein, Legitimacy in Intergovernmental and Non-State Global Governance,
18 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 17, 20–21, 42 (2011).
140
Id. at 22.
141
See id. But see Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for
Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173, 174 (1997) (describing this attitude toward
public participation in administrative law as a “fetish”).
142
See Jane A. Flegal, Anna-Maria Hubert, David R. Morrow & Juan B. Moreno-Cruz, Solar
Geoengineering: Social Science, Legal, Ethical, and Economic Frameworks, 44 ANN. REV. ENV’T &
RES. 399, 404–06 (2019).
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the right to govern via reasonable, lawful expert decision-making.143 But a
claim to legitimacy can be derived from multiple sources at once.144 With an
endeavor as controversial and troubling as solar geoengineering, NOAA and
the federal government would do well to make as strong a case as they can.145
The NEPA process would allow NOAA meaningful public engagement
in research activities. At a basic level, the public engagement process is a
chance for agencies to inform and educate people on projects that may affect
them.146 These members of the public are stakeholders as they “have an
interest or stake in an issue, such as individuals, interest groups, [or]
communities.”147 Once informed, the public can then weigh in on the
proposal, potentially influencing the agency’s decision-making.148
Of course, public engagement does not necessarily mean public control.
An agency can scale the level of public participation depending on a project’s
potential impacts and the discretion it has over implementation.149 Lower risk
and fewer discretion cuts in favor of less public inclusion. Greater risk and
more open-ended program needs, however, could be reasons for greater
collaboration with stakeholders. At the low end of public engagement, the
agency could limit itself to merely informing the public of the nature of the
project without giving members of the public an opportunity to comment.150
At the high end, the agency could delegate final decision-making authority
to the public by ballot or proxy vote.151
The amount of public engagement needed for initial federal research of
solar geoengineering lies somewhere between these extremes. Specifically,
NOAA should engage in a consultation process with the interested public
that informs them of the nature and bounds of its stratospheric aerosol
143
See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 470–72, 553–56 (2003).
144
See Bernstein, supra note 139, at 23, 42.
145
See SHUCHI TALATI & PETER C. FRUMHOFF, STRENGTHENING PUBLIC INPUT ON SOLAR
GEOENGINEERING RESEARCH 3–4 (2020); see also Michael B. Gerrard, Introduction, in CLIMATE
ENGINEERING AND THE LAW 1, 25–26 (Michael B. Gerrard & Tracy Hester eds., 2018) (outlining a
governance structure that could bolster legitimacy of research).
146
See Adrien Abecassis, Charles R. Corbett, Benjamin Harris, Edward A. Parson & Jesse L.
Reynolds, Comment on the Proposed Governance Framework for Harvard University’s Stratospheric
Controlled Perturbation Experiment (“SCoPEx”) by the SCoPEx Advisory Committee. 2 (July 31, 2020),
https://legal-planet.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/SCoPEx-comment-letter-31Jul2020-Submitted.pdf
[https://perma.cc/68F5-6NQB] [hereinafter Comment Letter].
147
EPA,
INTRODUCTION
TO
THE
PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION
TOOLKIT
3,
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-05/documents/ppg_english_full-2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5VYB-PHDM].
148
Comment Letter, supra note 146, at 2.
149
EPA, supra note 147, at 12–16.
150
Id. at 14.
151
Id. at 15.
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research, invites comment, reviews, faithfully deliberates on the issues
raised, and meaningfully responds.152 A meaningful response could include
revising the program’s design or controls, depending on the agency’s
resources, objectives, and flexibility. Critically, it would also give NOAA an
opportunity to inform the public on what the research is not. A significant
portion of public discourse on solar geoengineering is distorted by
conspiracy theory misinformation.153 A public engagement process with a
robust education component could inoculate some members of the public
against misinformation on the subject.154
The NEPA process is well equipped to facilitate such a public
consultation—perhaps uniquely so. NEPA requires agencies to publicly
share information and analysis on environmentally significant proposals. It
creates an opportunity for public comment, and the agency is obliged to
review, summarize, and respond to those comments. Though agencies need
not act on the issues raised, NEPA provides opportunity and incentive to
correct course, thus making project improvement more likely. Finally, the
process is subject to a well-developed body of case law and an expansive set
of implementing regulations.155 These legal authorities would give the
environmental review process the concreteness and heft that a completely
voluntary, nonstatutory public engagement process would lack. An
environmental assessment under the auspices of federal law simply has a
stronger claim to legitimacy than one occurring via an informal, ad hoc, or
completely voluntary process.156
Another element of legitimacy is lawfulness: a legitimate agency action
complies with the requirements of the law in good faith.157 Here, full and
faithful satisfaction of NEPA militates in favor of providing at least some
risk analysis. Congress’s appropriation to NOAA Research is genuinely
extraordinary, and NEPA urges agencies to thoughtfully consider ex ante the
potential environmental consequences of extraordinary or controversial
proposals. Moreover, the potential risks at hand with solar geoengineering
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See Comment Letter, supra note 146, at 6–7 (citing EPA, supra note 147, at 14).
See Corbett, supra note 133, at 13.
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See id. at 9.
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See Spensley, supra note 74, at 682–90.
156
Nonstate governance processes can still make a strong claim to legitimacy on the basis of
“effectiveness, efficiency, expertise, and open, fair procedures.” Jesse L. Reynolds & Edward A. Parson,
Nonstate Governance of Solar Geoengineering Research, 160 CLIMATIC CHANGE 323, 336 (2020). The
argument here is that federal agencies have an independent claim to legitimacy by virtue of being a lawful
part of the government. Moreover, agencies can simultaneously bolster their authority by demonstrating
many of the same qualities and values that lend legitimacy to nonstate governance processes.
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See Bressman, supra note 143, at 556.
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research are profoundly significant, if indirect and diffuse. Invoking a CX in
these circumstances, and nothing more, would be inappropriate.
B. A Better Research Agenda
More expansive NEPA review—one that goes beyond what the statute
and the implementing regulations strictly require—may also improve the
research agenda and its governance. There is a small but energetic
community of scientific and governance experts working on issues raised by
the prospect of solar geoengineering.158 The agency should avail itself in a
public comment period to the resources and expertise of these research
communities, as NEPA would require. Doing so publicly via an open process
would communicate and publicize the fact that this expert consultation is
taking place, potentially bolstering public confidence in the program.
Separately, it would allow experts to weigh in who were overlooked during
informal agency consultation processes. Input from experts who have views
contrary to stakeholders advocating for research would be particularly
valuable. A public process can also improve the quality of input given by
experts, as publication provides an incentive to sharpen, temper, and
substantiate advice. Informal consultation processes, meanwhile, would
remain available to elicit advice that experts may not wish to state publicly.
Comment from nonexperts and laypeople may also improve the quality
of the research agenda.159 The public, by virtue of its size and diversity,
possesses knowledge and experiences the agency does not. Laypeople hence
can provide new insights and identify weak points that government officials
and experts may overlook. At a minimum, they can educate the agency on
public preferences about the project.160
A public engagement period would also give a few complementary
climate policy processes time to come to fruition. The National Academies
of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine (NAS) is finalizing a report on
research priorities and governance recommendations for solar
geoengineering.161 NAS recently produced an authoritative report on a
research agenda on negative emissions technologies that has oriented
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See IPCC, supra note 3, at 349–52 cross-ch. box 10 (summarizing findings of this scholarship).
Rossi, supra note 141, at 182, 185–87 (explaining that public participation can “counteract[]
myopia by improving information available to agency decisionmakers and citizens”).
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See id. at 186.
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See Talati, supra note 18; see also Developing a Research Agenda and Research Governance
Approaches for Climate Intervention Strategies That Reflect Sunlight to Cool Earth, NAT’L ACADS. SCIS.
ENG’G & MED., https://www.nationalacademies.org/our-work/developing-a-research-agenda-andresearch-governance-approaches-for-climate-intervention-strategies-that-reflect-sunlight-to-cool-earth
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research, development, and demonstration efforts in the field.162 It is widely
believed that NAS’s report on solar geoengineering will prove similarly
authoritative.163 Investing time in a public engagement process would allow
the Academy to complete its report. The agency could then incorporate
NAS’s findings into its final PEA and research plan.
Developing a PEA would also give the rest of the federal government
time to commit to more vigorous climate mitigation and adaptation policies.
President Biden has recently announced a suite of ambitious directives and
initiatives on climate.164 Solar geoengineering is no substitute for
comprehensive climate policy. Proceeding with climate engineering research
now, after President Trump withdrew from the Paris Agreement and repealed
many climate regulations,165 risks sending the dangerous message that SAI
can replace or run ahead of deep emissions cuts. It would therefore be
prudent to give the federal government time to begin realizing its climate
strategy.166 In this regard, NEPA’s time investment would be another tool for
improving the program’s robustness.
C. Model Governance at a Low Cost
Lastly, the final PEA and the public engagement process that created it
would be valuable work products in themselves. The United States is
breaking new ground with this research program. The final PEA could serve
as a model governance document for other governments or institutions to
consider when developing their own research priorities. For instance, the
PEA could collect and digest resources on the environmental and social risks
of solar geoengineering as well as the governance methods for limiting those
risks. It could provide an opportunity for a clear, public articulation of the
162

See generally NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., NEGATIVE EMISSIONS TECHNOLOGIES
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See, e.g., H. SELECT COMM. ON THE CLIMATE CRISIS, supra note 25, at 526 (recommending for
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investigate” solar geoengineering).
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Popovich & Hiroko Tabuchi, Tracking the Environmental Rules Reversed Under Trump, N.Y. TIMES
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program’s purpose, which allows the agency to contextualize its research
within overarching climate policy efforts. Private research entities and
nonprofits are trying to launch similar public engagement processes,167 but it
is a job far better suited for the federal government. The administrative
burden of the PEA would be small. NEPA can be unduly burdensome, but
those critiques are raised in response to far more intensive environmental
reviews analyzing significant physical impacts. It is highly unlikely that
NOAA Research’s PEA will uncover significant environmental impacts
giving rise to the need for an extensive and expensive EIS. Similar PEAs that
NOAA has completed were short by NEPA standards.168 It is also unlikely
that completing a PEA here would increase the agency’s existing risk of
litigation. Many stakeholders are deeply opposed to any solar
geoengineering research.169 NOAA Research faces risk of litigation
regardless of how it decides to proceed under NEPA. Completing a PEA on
its own initiative would communicate a good faith effort to comply with the
statute’s requirements.
CONCLUSION
Climate change affects everyone, and so does the prospect of solar
geoengineering. The public deserves an opportunity to weigh in on the matter
and be apprised of the significant environmental, social, and political risks
of research. It is doubtful that these interests and concerns alone would be
sufficient to compel environmental review under NEPA. Nonetheless, the
federal government must take responsibility for its solar geoengineering
research and govern it effectively. NOAA should not pass up this opportunity
to demonstrate real leadership on climate policy.
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